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Current	 theory	 of	 mind	 research	 faces	 the	 challenge	 of	 reconciling	 two	 sets	 of	
seemingly	 incompatible	 findings:	While	 children	 come	 to	 solve	 explicit	 verbal	 false	 belief	
(FB)	 tasks	 from	 around	 age	 4,	 recent	 studies	 with	 various	 less	 explicit	 measures	 such	 as	
looking	time,	anticipatory	looking	and	spontaneous	behavior	suggest	that	even	infants	can	
succeed	 on	 some	 FB	 tasks.	 In	 response	 to	 this	 tension,	 two-systems	 theories	 propose	 to	
distinguish	between	an	early-developing	system,	tracking	simple	forms	of	mental	states,	and	




account	 a	protagonist’s	 true	or	 false	belief	 about	 the	 location	of	 an	object	 in	 their	 active	
helping	behavior.	In	contrast,	toddlers’	helping	behavior	did	not	differentiate	between	true	















belief	 reasoning”	 (Helming,	 Strickland,	 &	 Jacob,	 2014).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 decades	 of	
research	with	a	variety	of	mostly	verbal	false	belief	(FB)	tasks	suggests	that	children	acquire	
the	 competence	 to	 ascribe	 beliefs	 around	 age	 4	 (for	 review,	 see	 the	 meta-analysis	 of	
Wellman,	Cross,	&	Watson,	2001).	Numerous	 findings	 indicate	 that	 the	emergence	of	 this	
competence	is	not	a	local	phenomenon,	affecting	performance	on	one	or	two	isolated	tasks.	
Instead	the	competence	reveals	itself	 in	systematically	 inter-correlated	ways	on	a	range	of	




But	 a	 rapidly	 growing	 body	 of	 new	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 infants	 and	 toddlers	
perform	 competently	 on	 implicit	 FB	 tasks	well	 before	 age	 4	 (for	 reviews,	 see	Baillargeon,	
Scott,	 &	 Bian,	 2016;	 Baillargeon,	 Scott,	 &	 He,	 2010;	 Carruthers,	 2013).	 Violation-of-
expectation	tasks	have	found	that	infants	look	longer	at	events	in	which	a	protagonist	acts	




&	 Dux,	 2012;	 Southgate,	 Senju,	 &	 Csibra,	 2007).	 Studies	 with	 interactive	 measures	 have	
shown	that	infants	and	toddlers	can	spontaneously	help	and	inform	others	in	ways	that	are	







How	 can	 these	 two	 seemingly	 incompatible	 sets	 of	 findings	 be	 reconciled?	 Three	
main	theoretical	responses	to	this	puzzle	of	belief	reasoning	are	currently	under	discussion.		
Late	 competence	accounts	 claim	 that	proper	ToM	capacities	 are	only	 required	 for	 solving	
explicit	 tasks,	whereas	 the	new	 implicit	 tasks	using	 looking	time	and	 interaction	measures	
reflect	much	 simpler	 cognitive	 capacities	 (Heyes,	 2014;	 Ruffman	&	 Perner,	 2005;	 Sirois	&	





do	 not	 reflect	 a	 deficit	 in	 ToM	 but	merely	 extraneous	 demands	 imposed	 by	 these	 tasks.		
These	demands	are	extraneous	in	the	sense	that	they	have	nothing	to	do	with	ToM	per	se,	
but	only	with	 linguistic	 and	other	 aspects	of	 the	explicit	 task	 structure	 (Baillargeon	et	 al.,	
2010;	Carruthers,	2013;	Leslie,	2005).		
Two-systems	 accounts	 oppose	both	 late	 and	 early	 competence	 accounts.	 	 Instead,	
they	claim,	 implicit	 tasks	do	 tap	ToM	abilities	of	 some	kind,	but	 these	precocious	abilities	
are	distinct	from	the	later-developing	conceptual	capacities	measured	in	explicit	tasks	(e.g.	





On	 a	 particularly	 promising	 two-systems	 account	 (Apperly	 &	 Butterfill,	 2009;	
Butterfill	 &	 Apperly,	 2013;	 Low	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 systems	 for	 tracking	
beliefs	and	other	mental	 states,	which	we	shall	 label	S1	and	S2.	Relative	 to	S2,	 system	S1	
trades	flexibility	for	gains	in	efficiency	by	relying	on	a	simpler	model	of	mental	states.	S1	is	
therefore	 limited	 in	ways	that	S2	 is	not.	For	our	purposes,	 the	crucial	 limit	 is	 that	S1	does	
not	enable	tracking	false	beliefs	essentially	involving	aspectuality.	To	illustrate	aspectuality,	




on	 implicit	 FB	 tasks	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 S1	 only,	 whereas	 success	 on	 explicit	 FB	 tasks	
requires	 S2.	 In	 that	 case,	 infants’	 performance	 should	 exhibit	 the	 limits	 of	 S1.	 They	may	
succeed	on	many	implicit	FB	tasks	which	do	not	essentially	involve	aspectuality,	such	as	the	






























































































































change-of-location	 false	 belief	 (Loc_FB),	 non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 true	 belief	
(Loc_TB),	 aspectual	 false	 belief	 (Asp_FB)	 and	 aspectual	 true	 belief	 (Asp_TB).	 Each	 child	
received	two	(in	two	exceptional	cases	three,	as	explained	in	the	Supplementary	Materials)	
trials	in	one	of	the	conditions.				
Materials.	 In	 the	non-aspectual	 task,	one	toy	object	 (a	ball,	a	soft	 toy	rabbit,	a	 toy	
dog	or	toy	donkey)	per	trial	and	two	boxes	were	used.	In	the	aspectual	task,	one	reversible	
soft	 toy	(a	bear,	bunny,	 tiger,	pig),	which	could	be	turned	 inside	out	through	a	zipper	and	
transformed	(into	a	honey	barrel,	a	carrot,	a	snail	and	a	cake,	respectively,	see	Figure	1),	and	












Procedure.	 Each	 child	 was	 tested	 in	 an	 interactive	 play	 setting	 with	 two	
experimenters.	 A	 parent	 was	 present	 during	 the	 session.	 After	 two	 warm-up	 trials	 (see	
Supplementary	Material	for	details),	children	standardly	received	two	trials	of	the	condition	
they	were	randomly	assigned	to.	In	exceptional	cases,	a	third	trial	was	administered.		
(1)	Non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 tasks.	The	basic	 sequence	of	events	 in	 these	
tasks,	modeled	on	Buttelmann	et	al.	(2009),	was	the	following:	There	were	two	boxes.	These	
were	 difficult	 to	 open,	 and	 the	 child	 learned	 how	 to	 open	 them.	 	 The	 protagonist,	 Susi,	







took	 the	 toy	out	of	 the	box	and	placed	 it	 in	 the	other	box,	 saying:	“Look,	Susi	and	




After	 her	 return	 (in	 the	 Loc_FB	 condition),	 or	 after	 the	 observed	 location	 change	 (in	 the	
Loc_TB	condition),	Susi	tried	to	open	the	box	where	her	toy	was	formerly	located.	Susi	failed	
to	open	the	box,	and	showed	disappointment.	We	call	this	event	the	signal	in	what	follows.	
If	 the	 child	 did	 not	 react	 spontaneously,	 Susi	 asked	 “Can	 you	 help	me?”.	 If	 the	 child	 still	
showed	 no	 reaction,	 E1	 prompted	 the	 child	 to	 help.	 If	 the	 child	 still	 refused,	 E1	 asked	
“Should	we	help	her	together?”,	but	didn’t	move	and	waited	to	see	where	the	child	would	




toy	 to	 the	 child.	 Then	 she	 sneakily	 transformed	 it	 to	 its	 other	 aspect	 saying:	 “Look!	 The	




Following	 familiarization,	 Susi	 returned	 for	 the	 test	 trials.	 As	 in	 non-aspectual	
conditions,	there	were	two	boxes.	These	were	difficult	to	open,	but	the	child	learned	how	to	
open	 them.	 	 Susi	 received	 the	 first	 soft	 toy	 and	 expressed	 her	 liking	 of	 it.	 Susi	 then	
announced	 that	 she	had	 forgotten	 something,	 and	 that	 she	would	 leave	 the	 toy	 in	 box	 1	
during	her	absence.	She	did	so	with	the	help	of	E1	(because	she	was	unable	to	open	the	box	








took	 the	 toy	out	 of	 box	 1	 and	 transformed	 it	while	 saying:	 “Look	 Susi	 and	 [child’s	
name]!”	and	alternating	gaze	between	the	child	and	E2.		E1	then	put	it	back	into	the	
box.	Susi	observed	this	event	closely,	saying:	“Ah,	I	see!	Yes!”		
After	 her	 return	 (in	 the	 Asp_FB	 condition),	 or	 after	 the	 observed	 aspect	 change	 (in	 the	
Asp_TB	condition),	Susi	moved	back	to	her	original	position.	E1	said,	“Look	Susi	and	[child’s	
















  open	box	1:	 the	child	clearly	 referred	 to	box	1,	either	by	approaching	 the	box	and	

















Predictions.	 In	 the	 Loc_FB	 condition,	 a	 child	 tracking	 Susi’s	 false	 belief	may	 recognize	
that	Susi	is	opening	box	1	because	she	believes,	falsely,	that	her	toy	is	in	box	1.	This	would	
give	the	child	a	reason	to	respond	by	opening	box	2,	which	actually	contains	Susi’s	toy.	The	
child	 has	 no	 comparable	 reason	 for	 opening	 box	 2	 in	 the	 Loc_TB	 condition.	 Accordingly,	





Recall	 that	 the	 two-systems	 account	 predicts	 that	 two-year-olds	 can	 track	 some	 false	








All	 in	 all,	 64	 children	 (32	 each	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 conditions)	
received	at	 least	one	valid	 (including	ambiguous)	 trial.	For	each	of	 these	children,	at	 least	
one	 trial	 was	 also	 unambiguous.	 (For	 details	 concerning	 more	 comprehensive	 analyses	
involving	invalid	and	ambiguous	trials,	see	Supplementary	Material.)	For	the	main	analysis,	
the	 first	 valid	 and	 unambiguous	 trial	 was	 used.	 When	 possible,	 one-tailed	 tests	 were	
conducted	whenever	directed	a	priori	hypotheses	were	tested	(such	that	children	perform	
more	often	“open	box	1”	in	contrast	to	“open	box	2/give	object”	behavior	in	the	TB	than	in	
the	 FB	 conditions).	 Figure	 3	 depicts	 children’s	 helping	 behavior	 in	 the	 first	 valid	 and	
unambiguous	 trial.	 In	 non-aspectual	 conditions,	 children’s	 helping	 behavior	 differed	
significantly	between	Loc_FB	and	Loc_TB	conditions	(p	=	.037,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	
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finding	 by	 Buttelmann	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 toddlers	 responded	 differentially	 in	
Loc_FB	 and	 Loc_TB	 tasks.	 Performance	 differed	 on	 the	 novel,	 aspectual	 tasks	 which	 we	
developed	to	test	the	predictions	of	the	two-systems	theory.	Children’s	helping	behavior	did	
not	differ	significantly	between	Asp_TB	and	Asp_FB	conditions.		
	 What	does	 this	pattern	show?	 	One	possibility	 is	 that	our	 results	do	 indeed	 reflect	
the	 characteristic	 signature	 limits	 in	 children’s	 early	 ToM	 abilities	 predicted	 by	 the	 two-






difference,	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 our	 novel	 aspectual	 tasks	 simply	 failed	 to	 uncover	




warm-up	 trial	 in	 which	 Susi	 went	 from	 being	 knowledgeable	 to	 ignorant	 concerning	 the	
location	of	a	 toy	 (as	described	 in	 the	Supplementary	Material).	This	might	have	 facilitated	
performance	in	the	non-aspectual	task	change	task	only.			
Differences	between	our	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	tasks	thus	reveal	the	need	for	
replication	 of	 our	 findings.	 The	 replication	 should	 use	 a	more	 stringent,	minimal	 contrast	
design	 in	which	 all	 but	 the	 crucial	 aspects	 (the	 content	 of	 the	 belief	 to	 be	 ascribed,	 and	
whether	 it	 is	 true	 or	 false)	 are	 kept	 as	 constant	 as	 possible	 across	 tasks.	 Experiment	 2	
therefore	 investigated	 possible	 signature	 limits	 in	 early	 belief	 understanding	 with	
thoroughly	 matched	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 tasks,	 and	 with	 larger	 sample	 size	
intended	to	ensure	sufficient	power.	
Experiment	2	





































	(1)	 Non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 tasks.	 The	 basic	 sequence	 of	 events	 in	 these	
tasks,	 adapted	 from	Buttelmann	 et	 al.	 (2009),	was	 the	 following:	 E2	 found	 two	 toys,	 and	
expressed	a	liking	for	them.	She	then	announced	that	she	had	forgotten	something	and	had	





  Loc_TB	 condition:	 E1	appeared	 from	behind	 the	 curtains,	 telling	 E2	 she	wanted	 to	
show	her	something	before	E2	left.		As	in	Loc_FB,	E1	then	took	one	of	the	toys	out	of	
the	 box	 and	 hit	 it	 under	 a	 tissue.	 The	 only	 difference	 was	 that	 E1’s	 actions	 were	
manifestly	witnessed	by	E2,	who	did	not	leave	the	room.	After	E1	had	hid	the	toy,	E2	
told	the	child	she	now	really	had	to	leave	and	left	the	room	for	several	seconds.		














aspectual	 task,	 except	 for	 the	 following	 differences:	When	 E1	 appeared	 from	 behind	 the	
curtains	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 she	 introduced	 only	 one	 reversible	 toy	 to	 the	 child.	 She	 then	


































All	 in	all,	109	children	 (51	 in	 the	non-aspectual	and	58	 in	 the	aspectual	conditions)	
received	at	least	one	valid	(including	ambiguous)	trial.	Of	these	children,	48	children	had	at	
least	 one	 valid	 and	 unambiguous	 trial	 per	 type	 of	 condition.	 (For	 details	 regarding	 the	
distribution	of	 all	 trials,	 including	 invalid	ones,	 see	Supplementary	Material.)	As	 in	 Exp.	 1,		
the	 first	 valid	 and	unambiguous	 trial	was	used	 for	 the	main	 analysis	 (see	 Figure	6;	 for	 an	
analysis	 including	 ambiguous	 trials,	 see	 Supplementary	 Material).	 In	 non-aspectual	
conditions,	 children’s	 helping	 behavior	 differed	 significantly	 between	 Loc_FB	 and	 Loc_TB	
conditions	(N	=	48,	p	=	 .018,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	 In	the	aspectual	tasks,	helping	
behavior	 did	 not	 differ	 significantly	 between	 Asp_FB	 and	 Asp_TB	 conditions	 (N	 =	 48,	p	 =	
.207,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).		
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In	Exp.	2	we	aimed	to	 test	 for	 the	patterns	of	 results	 found	 in	Exp.	1	with	more	stringent	








































Two	 experiments	 tested	 for	 signature	 limits	 in	 the	 toddlers’	 early	 understanding	 of	 false	
belief	 as	 indicated	 in	 their	 active	 helping	 behavior.	 Both	 experiments	 found,	 in	 line	 with	
previous	work,	 that	children’s	helping	behavior	differed	between	a	condition	 in	which	the	
protagonist	 had	 a	 true	 belief	 and	 a	 condition	 in	 which	 she	 had	 a	 false	 belief	 about	 the	
location	of	 an	object.	However,	 in	parallel	 aspectual	 tasks	 in	which	 the	protagonist	had	a	
true	 or	 false	 belief	 essentially	 involving	 aspectuality,	 toddlers’	 helping	 behavior	 did	 not	
differ	 significantly	 between	 true	 and	 false	 belief	 conditions.	 Experiment	 2	 controlled	 for	
differences	 in	 inferential	 complexity	 between	 the	 tasks	 in	 terms	 of	working	memory	 and	
other	performance	factors,	replicating	the	basic	results	of	Experiment	1.	
It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 these	 findings	 are	 not	 particularly	 strong	 or	
unambiguous.	 	 It	 is	true	that	a	key	prediction	of	the	two-systems	account	was	born	out	 in	
the	 difference	 between	 performance	 on	 non-aspectuality,	 change-of-location	 tasks	 and	
















her	more	distal	 goal	 (getting	her	 toy).	But	 for	methodological	 reasons,	our	 tasks	 focus	on	






ideally	 involve	 this,	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 aspectual	 FB	 condition	might	 in	 principle	 have	
simply	 overwhelmed	 and	 paralyzed	 children.	 	 While	 we	 cannot	 rule	 out	 this	 possibility	
altogether,	we	think	it	unlikely.	This	 is	 in	part	because	children	did	not	need	to	show	such	
complex	 responses:	 they	 could	 succeed	merely	by	pointing	 to,	 or	 giving,	 the	 toy,	without	
any	further	communicative	attempt.		Further,	in	another	recent	study	with	analogous	design	
but	 in	which	 the	 aspectuality	was	 not	 realized	 by	 revertible	 objects	with	 hidden	 aspects,	
children	 showed	 qualitatively	 the	 very	 same	 pattern	 of	 responses	 (Oktay-Gür,	 Schulz,	 &	
Rakoczy,	2017).	
What	do	the	results	show?		




observed	 here	 are	 the	 very	 signature	 limits	 in	 early	 mindreading	 predicted	 by	 the	 two-
system	account	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Butterfill	&	Apperly,	2013).	On	this	account,	an	





in	 contrast,	 operating	 with	 relational	 attitudes	 is	 not	 sufficient.	 Rather,	 fully-fledged	
propositional	 attitude	 concepts	 are	 needed.	 The	 pattern	 of	 findings	 in	 our	 studies	might	
thus	 indeed	 reflect	 signature	 limits	 of	 an	 early-developing	 ToM	 capacity	 that	 operates	 by	
tracking	relational	attitudes	rather	than	ascribing	fully-fledged	propositional	attitudes.	This	
possibility	gains	plausibility	when	considering	the	present	findings	in	concert	with	a	recent	
study	 which	 investigated	 the	 same	 structured	 contrast	 between	 aspectual	 and	 non-






line	 of	 research	 (Low	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Low	&	Watts,	 2013).	 It	 is	 just	 what	 is	 to	 be	 expected	
according	to	the	two-systems	account.	
Alternatively,	 however,	 the	 present	 findings	 might	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	




objects	 but	 not	 about	 their	 locations.	 	 Such	 an	 assumption	might	 in	 principle	 have	 been	
triggered	 by	 subjects’	 difficulty	 in	 understanding	 and	 coordinating	 different	 aspects	 of	





How	 might	 future	 research	 decide	 between	 these	 two	 interpretations?	 The	 two-
systems	interpretation	predicts	that	the	difference	in	performance	between	non-aspectual	
and	 aspectual	 tasks	 will	 be	 observed	 in	 implicit	 but	 not	 explicit	 tasks,	 whereas	 the	
alternative	(‘omniscience’/extraneous	task	demands)	 interpretation	predicts	that,	all	other	
things	being	equal,	this	difference	 in	performance	will	appear	 in	explicit	as	well	as	 implicit	
tasks.	 A	 fundamental	 problem	 for	 the	 omniscience	 interpretation,	 however,	 is	 that	 other	
studies	 have	measured	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 responses	 to	 a	 single	 scenario.	 These	 studies	
have	uniformly	observed	a	difference	in	performance	between	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	
implicit	 tasks	which	disappears	on	explicit	 tasks	 (Low	et	al.,	 2014;	Edwards	&	Low,	2017).		
Furthermore,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 another	 study	developed	explicit	 tasks	 implementing	
the	 very	 same	 contrasts	 between	 aspectual	 and	 non-aspectual	 we	 used,	 and	 found	 no	
performance	differences	between	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	tasks	(Rakoczy	et	al.,	2015).	
This	 suggests	 that	 an	 interpretation	 in	 terms	 of	 omniscience	 about	 aspectuality	 and	
extraneous	task	demands	is	unlikely	to	explain	the	present	findings.	
Three	potential	methodological	 caveats	with	 regard	 to	 the	present	 findings	 should	
be	mentioned.	First,	 it	might	be	wondered	whether	 the	stimuli	 in	 the	present	 study	were	




object	 individuation	with	 exactly	 these	 stimuli	 show	 that	 even	 1-year-olds	 do	 understand	
the	dual	nature	of	these	objects	(Cacchione,	Schaub,	&	Rakoczy,	2013).	However,	it	might	be	
objected	that	children	could	have	represented	the	situation	in	terms	that	would	undermine	
our	 claim	 to	 be	 testing	 an	 understanding	 of	 false	 beliefs	 involving	 aspectuality.	 After	 all,	
children	 might	 have	 represented	 the	 protagonist	 as	 having	 beliefs	 about	 one	 object	 (a	
bunny,	for	example)	with	another	object	(a	carrot,	for	example)	hidden	inside	it.	If	this	were	
true,	 what	we	 term	 ‘aspectual’	 tasks	would	 in	 fact	 have	 been	 non-aspectual	 tasks	 about	
location	and	containment.	As	this	objection	nicely	 illustrates,	 it	 is	difficult	or	 impossible	to	
create	situations	that	can	only	be	understood	as	involving	aspectuality.	However,	two	points	
should	 be	 noted	 in	 response	 to	 this	 objection.	 First,	 if	 the	 children	 in	 the	 aspectuality	
conditions	 really	 had	 represent	 the	 protagonist	 as	 having	 beliefs	 about	 one	 object	 being	
hidden	in	another,	we	would	expect	their	performance	to	differ	between	FB	and	TB	just	as	it	
did	 on	 the	 non-aspectuality	 conditions.	 In	 fact	 this	 is	 not	 what	 we	 observed.	 Second,	 a	
recent	 study	 with	 older	 children	 (Rakoczy	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 compared	 performance	 on	 tasks	
involving	the	stimuli	used	here	with	new	stimuli	that	also	had	dual	aspects	but	could	not	be	
construed	as	involving	one	object	hiding	another	(for	example,	a	single	object	featured	both	
as	 Susi	 and	 as	 the	 doctor).	 Children’s	 performance	 with	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 stimuli	 was	




or	 search	 in,	 a	 box?	 Using	 this	 dependent	 measure	 limits	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 findings	




compensate	 for	 this	weakness	 by,	 for	 example,	 combining	multiple	 dependent	measures.	










All	 in	 all,	 the	 two	 experiments	 reported	 here	 present	 preliminary	 evidence	
compatible	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 early-developing	 ToM	 capacities	 are	 subject	 to	 signature	
limits.	 Taken	 together	with	 recent	 findings	 that	 on	 an	 explicit	 level	 older	 children	 do	 not	
show	 the	 same	 signature	 limits	 but	 perform	 uniformly	 across	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 FB	 tasks	




findings	by	 themselves	 cannot	 strictly	decide	between	 this	and	alternative	accounts	given	
the	methodological	caveats	just	identified.	 	Further	research	is	needed	to	test	for	patterns	




concerning	 the	 generality	 and	 flexibility	 of	 young	 children’s	 abilities	 to	 track	 beliefs	 and	
other	mental	 states	 (Yott	&	 Poulin-Dubois,	 2012,	 2016).	 Such	 tasks	must	 involve	 a	 broad	
range	of	scenarios,	belief	contents	and	methods	(such	violation-of-expectation,	anticipatory	
looking,	 communicative	 and	 interactive	 measures).	 Perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 more	
attention	 to	 when	 and	 why	 infants	 fail	 to	 track	 mental	 states	 is	 required,	 ideally	 in	
conjunction	with	 further	direct	comparisons	between	performance	on	 implicit	and	explicit	
tasks.	This	is,	after	all,	where	the	competing	accounts	make	clearly	different	predictions.	
One	particularly	 instructive	strategy	 in	this	context	may	be	to	 investigate	children’s	
readiness	 to	 learn	 to	 track	 beliefs	 about	 novel	 scenarios	 (see	 also	 Heyes,	 2014).	 For	
example,	when	 children	 are	 confronted	 repeatedly	with	 scenarios	 in	which	 novel	 objects	
change	their	(unusual)	locations	or	their	(unusual)	aspects	in	novel	ways,	children’s	learning	
history	might	be	particularly	instructive.	According	to	an	early	competence	account,	infants	
and	 young	 children	 have	 a	 full-blown	 concept	 of	 belief.	 It	 follows	 that	 after	 initial	
asymmetries	regarding	previous	experience	with	unusual	locations	or	unusual	aspects	have	
been	evened	out	 through	 training,	 young	 learners	 should	 be	 capable	 of	 solving	 aspectual	




































Edwards, K. and Low, J. (2017). Reaction time profiles of adults’ action prediction reveal two 











































































































































and	one	box	were	used	per	 trial.	Boxes	were	covered	with	a	 tissue	on	the	 inside	 to	 leave	


















































Susi	 announces	 “Oh	 no,	 I	 forgot	 something!	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	
short”	and	leaves.	E1	shows	a	reversible	mini	soft	toy	to	the	child	
and	its	dual	aspectuality:	“Look	what	I	got	here!	A	bunny!	And	now	
I’ll	 show	you	something:	 the	bunny	 is	also	a	carrot.	Where	 is	 the	
bunny	now?	Can	you	make	it	so	that	it’s	a	bunny	again?”	The	child	














Susi?	 Look,	 what	 I	 do	 now.	 Okay.	 Hihi.	 Shh!”	 She	 changes	 the	
location	 of	 the	 target	 in	 a	 sneaky	 way	 emphasizing	 at	 the	 end	
“And	Susi	can’t	see	that,	right?”	
True	Belief:	Susi	comes	back	a	few	seconds	after	she	left.	E1	says	
“Look,	 Susi	 and	 [name	 of	 child]!	 Like	 this	 and	 like	 this!”	 She	
changes	 the	 location	 of	 the	 target,	 thereby	 alternating	 gaze	
between	 the	 child	 and	 the	 puppet.	 Susi	 observes	 this	 event	




Susi?	 Look,	what	 I	 do	now.	Okay.	Hihi.	 Shh!”	 and	 transforms	 the	
object	 into	 its	 2nd	 aspect	 in	 a	 sneaky	 way	 and	 puts	 it	 back,	
emphasizing	at	the	end	“And	Susi	can’t	see	that,	right?”	
True	Belief:	Susi	comes	back	a	few	seconds	after	she	left.	E1	says	
“Look,	 Susi	 and	 [name	 of	 child]!	 Like	 this	 and	 like	 this!”	 She	
changes	 the	 aspect	 of	 the	 target,	 thereby	 alternating	 gaze	
between	the	child	and	the	puppet.	Susi	observes	this	event	closely	






























prevented	 by	 E1	 from	 grasping	 inside	 under	 the	 tissue.	 E1	 placed	 the	 two	 boxes	
















toy	 out	 of	 the	 box	 and	 placed	 it	 in	 the	 other	 box,	 saying:	 “Look,	 Susi	 and	 [child’s	
name]!”	and	alternating	gaze	between	the	child	and	E2.	Susi	observed	the	 location	
change	closely,	saying:	“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”		








if	 the	 child	 still	 refused	 E1	 asked	 to	 help	 together	 (“Should	 we	 help	 her	 together?”)	 but	
didn’t	move	and	waited	where	the	child	would	go.	Children’s	 reactions	 to	 the	signal	were	
coded.	The	task	was	repeated	with	different	boxes	and	a	different	target	toy.	
(2)	Aspectual	 task.	After	 the	warm-up	 trial	 children	were	 first	 familiarized	with	 the	
dual	aspectuality	of	the	target	objects.	To	this	end,	the	puppet	left	the	room	and	E1	showed	
the	 first	 mini	 soft	 toy	 (which	 one	 was	 fully	 counterbalanced)	 to	 the	 child.	 Then	 she	
transformed	it	to	its	2nd	aspect	saying:	“Look!	The	X	is	also	a	Y!”	(e.g.	bunny	and	carrot).	She	
did	 that	 in	 a	 sneaky	way,	whispering	 “Shh”	 and	 told	 the	 child:	 “Susi	 does	 not	 know	 that,	
right?”	to	ensure	that	the	child	would	not	assume	that	Susi	knew	all	aspects	of	the	object.	
The	child	was	then	asked	to	transform	the	object	into	its	original	state:	“Can	you	make	it	so	
that	 it	 is	 a	 bunny	 again?”	 If	 the	 child	 was	 not	 able	 or	 not	 willing,	 E1	 helped	 and	 both	
transformed	the	object	 together.	This	was	 repeated	with	a	second	object	which	was	 later	
used	for	the	second	test	trial.		




E1	 in	 case	 the	 child	 was	 not	 able	 to	 do	 so	 on	 her	 own)	 but	 was	 prevented	 by	 E1	 from	













alternating	 gaze	 between	 the	 child	 and	 E2	 -	 and	 put	 it	 back	 into	 the	 box.	 Susi	
observed	this	event	closely,	saying:	“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”		
After	 her	 return	 (FB)/	 the	 observed	 aspect	 change	 (TB)	 Susi	 moved	 back	 to	 her	 original	
position.	Now,	E1	 stated	again:	 “Look	Susi	and	 [child’s	name]!”	and	 took	 the	 transformed	
toy	(e.g.	carrot)	out	of	the	box	and	placed	 it	approximately	1m	away	from	the	box	on	the	
carpet	 equidistant	 between	 Susi	 and	 the	 child.	 Susi	 observed	 this	 location-change	 closely	
saying	“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”,	then	she	looked	from	the	box	to	the	object	saying	first	“Hmm”	and	
then	“Okay”.	She	then	tried	to	open	the	box.	This	signal	and	the	following	events	were	the	









  open	box	1	(in	both	tasks):	 if	 the	child	clearly	referred	to	box	1	(by	the	puppet)	by	
approaching	the	box	and	opening	it	successfully	or	by	trying	to	open	it	(e.g.	pulling	
the	elastic	band)	even	if	not	successfully.			
  open	 box	 2	 (in	 the	 non-aspectual	 tasks)/give	 the	 object	 to	 the	 puppet	 (in	 the	
aspectual	 tasks):	 if	 the	 child	 clearly	 referred	 to	 box	 2	 by	 approaching	 the	box	 and	
opening	it	successfully	or	by	trying	to	open	it,	or	handed	the	object	to	the	puppet.	
There	were	two	ways	in	which	a	given	trial	could	fail	to	fall	into	one	of	these	two	categories:	
  ambiguous:	 This	 coding	 applied	 if	 the	 child	 showed	 a	 behavior	 that	 clearly	 was	 a	





  invalid:	 This	 coding	was	 given	 if	 a	 parent	 interfered,	 if	 the	 child	 did	 not	 show	any	
reaction	at	all,	 if	the	child	left	the	scene	during	the	trial	or	did	not	pay	attention	to	
the	event	sequence,	or	 if	 the	child	could	not	be	held	back	 from	reacting	too	early,	
that	 is,	producing	a	behavior	 (such	as	opening	box	1	or	 fetching	the	object)	before	














Asp_FB	condition).	 	Data	 from	64	children	were	 thus	used	 in	 the	 final	 analysis.	Mean	age	
was	M	=	31;3	(SD	=	3.09,	6	girls,	10	boys)	in	the	non-aspectual	FB	condition,	M	=	31;3	(SD	=	
2.14,	 6	 girls,	 10	 boys)	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 TB	 condition,	M	 =	 31;2	 (SD	 =	 2.73,	 6	 girls,	 10	





experimental	error	 (N	=	1),	because	the	child	was	 inattentive	 (N	=	3),	did	not	react	 to	the	
signal	(N	=	1)	or	reacted	before	the	signal	(N	=	3).	For	2	children	the	first	trial	was	coded	as	
ambiguous	reaction	(both	in	the	Asp_TB	condition)	because	the	child	took	the	not-referred-
to	 object	 and	 tried	 to	 put	 it	 in	 the	 box	 (N	 =	 1)	 or	 gave	 another	 object	 to	 Susi	 (N	 =	 1).	 2	
children	 showed	 an	 ambiguous	 reaction	 in	 both	 first	 trials	 (gave	 a	 car	 to	 Susi/shook	 her	
hand;	 in	 the	Loc_FB	and	Asp_TB	condition).	As	explained	above,	because	both	 trials	were	
ambiguous,	a	third	trial	was	administered	 in	these	cases.	All	 in	all,	64	children	(32	each	 in	







second	 trial	 if	 this	 was	 a	 valid	 trial.	 When	 possible,	 one-tailed	 tests	 were	 conducted	
whenever	directed	a	priori	hypotheses	were	tested	(such	that	children	perform	more	often	
“open	 box	 1”	 in	 contrast	 to	 “open	 box	 2/give	 object”	 behavior	 in	 the	 TB	 than	 in	 the	 FB	
conditions).	Figure	3	depicts	children’s	helping	behavior	in	the	first	valid	and	unambiguous	
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two-tailed	 Fisher’s	 exact	 test).	 In	 the	aspectual	 task,	 conditions	did	not	differ	 significantly	





	 True	belief	 False	belief	 True	belief	 False	belief	
open	box	1	 12	 6	 12	 12	
open	box	2/give	object	 4	 9	 1	 4	
ambiguous	response	 0	 1	 3	 0	
	
Aggregate	score	including	all	trials.	Since	for	a	large	number	of	children	at	least	one	
trial	had	been	coded	 invalid	or	ambiguous	 (N	=	10	 in	 the	non-aspectual	 task;	N	=	4	 in	 the	
aspectual	 task)	 a	 sum	 score	 of	 two	 trials	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 valid	measure	 of	 children’s	
overall	performance.	In	order	to	also	include	the	second	valid	and	unambiguous	trials	in	the	
analysis,	 an	 aggregate	 score	 was	 calculated	 for	 which	 children	 were	 separated	 into	 two	
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groups:	 children	who	 consistently	 referred	 to	box	2	 (non-aspectual	 task)/	 gave	 the	object	
(aspectual	 task)	 in	 their	valid	and	unambiguous	trials	and	children	who	did	not	do	so	 (see	
Table	2).	One-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	 tests	 confirmed	 the	 results	of	 the	main	analysis:	 in	 the	
non-aspectual	task	helping	behavior	differed	significantly	between	the	TB	and	FB	condition	





	 TB	 FB	 TB	 FB	
consistently	referred	to	box	
2/give	object	 4	 10	 1	 2	
did	not	consistently	refer	to	





































hiding	 procedure	was	 administered	 because	 this	was	 considered	 to	 possibly	 differentially	





curtains,	 where	 she	 was	 not	 visible	 for	 the	 child.	 Now,	 E2	 told	 the	 child	 that	 she	 forgot	
something	and	left	the	room.	E1	appeared	from	behind	the	curtains,	greeted	the	child	and	
sat	down	at	the	table.	Accidentally,	she	placed	a	tissue	on	one	side	of	the	table.	Then	she	
took	 two	soft	 toys	out	of	a	bag,	 showed	them	to	 the	child,	placed	them	on	the	 table	and	













  TB	condition:	E1	performed	 the	very	 same	action	of	 taking	 the	out	of	 the	box	and	
placing	it	under	the	tissue	as	in	the	FB	condition,	but	the	crucial	difference	was	that	
this	 was	 witnessed	 by	 E2	 who	 did	 not	 leave	 the	 room.	 Rather,	 E2	 stayed	 and	 E1	







inside,	saying	“Hmm,	Eh?	 I	don’t	understand…	but	where	 is….”).	As	 in	Exp.	1,	 this	event	 is	














the	 non-aspectual	 task,	 except	 for	 the	 following	 differences:	 When	 E1	 appeared	 from	
behind	the	curtains	for	the	first	time,	she	introduced	only	one	reversible	mini	soft	toy	to	the	
child	and	–	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	non-aspectual	 task	 -	 transformed	 it	 to	 its	2nd	aspect	 saying:	
“Look!	The	X	is	also	an	Y!”	(e.g.,	bunny	and	carrot).	She	did	that	in	a	sneaky	way,	whispering	
“Shh”	and	 told	 the	child:	 “’E2	does	not	know	that,	 right?”,	again,	 to	ensure	 that	 the	child	
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would	 not	 assume	 E1	 to	 know	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 object.	 The	 child	 was	 then	 asked	 to	
transform	the	object	into	its	original	state:	“Can	you	make	it	so	that	it	is	a	bunny	again?”	If	
the	child	was	not	able	or	not	willing,	E1	helped	and	both	transformed	the	object	together.	
Then	 E1	 placed	 the	 object	 in	 its	 original	 aspect	 on	 the	 table	 and	 returned	 behind	 the	
curtains.	The	following	sequence	was	the	same	as	in	the	non-aspectual	task,	despite	the	fact	
that	E2	–	upon	her	return	-	discovered	only	one	object	and	put	this	one	into	the	box	before	
she	 left	 again	 in	 the	 FB	 condition.	 But	 instead	 of	 changing	 the	 location	 of	 one	 object,	 E1	
appeared	from	behind	the	curtains,	took	the	object	out	of	the	box,	transformed	it	to	its	2nd	
aspect	and	put	it	back	into	the	box.	 	This	was	done	either	in	the	absence	(FB)	or	presence	













E2	 announces:	 “Oh	 no,	 I	 forgot	 something!	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	
short.”	 and	 leaves.	 E1	 appears	 from	 behind	 the	 curtains,	 greets	
the	 child	 and	 sits	 down	 at	 E2’s	 chair.	 Accidently,	 she	 places	 a	
tissue	on	one	side	of	the	table.	Then	she	takes	two	soft	toys	out	of	
a	 bag	 saying	 “Look	what	 I	 got	 here,	 what’s	 that?	 Yes,	 a	 bunny!	
And	look	what	else	I	have!	A	bear!	I	put	them	both	here.	Okay”	E1	
leaves	 behind	 the	 curtains.	 E2	 re-enters	 the	 room	 and	 sees	 the	
toys:	“Wow!	A	bunny,	it’s	great!	And	a	bear!	It’s	great	too!”	Then	




E2	 announces:	 “Oh	 no,	 I	 forgot	 something!	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	




is	 the	 bunny	 now?	 Can	 you	make	 it	 so	 that	 it’s	 a	 bunny	 again?”	
The	child	 transforms	the	object,	 if	necessary	with	 the	help	of	E1.	
E1	emphasizes:	“And	Susi	doesn’t	know	that,	right?	Shh!	I	put	the	
bunny	here.	Okay”	E1	leaves	behind	the	curtains.	E2	re-enters	the	













takes	 one	 toy	 out	 of	 the	 box	 and	 places	 it	 under	 the	 tissue,	
thereby	 alternating	 gaze	 between	 the	 child	 and	 E2.	 E2	 observes	








it	 back	 emphasizing	 at	 the	 end:	 “And	 Susi	 can’t	 see	 that,	 right?	
Shh!”	E1	leaves	behind	the	curtains.	
True	Belief:	 E1	appears	 from	behind	 the	curtains	and	 says	 “Look	
[names	of	E2	and	child]	what	I	do	now!	Like	this	and	like	this!”	She	
takes	the	toy	out	of	the	box,	transforms	 it	 into	 its	2nd	aspect	 in	a	
sneaky	way	and	puts	it	back,	thereby	alternating	gaze	between	the	
child	and	E2.	E2	observes	this	event	closely	saying	”Ah	I	see!	Yes!”	













Coding.	As	 in	Exp.	1,	 the	 first	 reaction	 to	 the	signal	was	coded	and	 it	was	determined	
whether	it	fell	into	one	of	the	two	central	categories:		
  help	 to	 search	 in	 the	box:	 if	 the	 child,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 signal,	 touched	 the	box,	
pulled	a	grip,	opened	one	of	the	doors,	tried	to	look	inside	etc.	
  give	 the	 object	 (under	 the	 tissue	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task/on	 the	 table	 in	 the	






(i)	 if	 the	 child	 showed	a	behavior	 that	 clearly	was	a	 reaction	 to	 the	 signal	 (i.e.	 the	
child’s	 behavior	 began	 after	 E2’s	 searching	 behavior	 and	 not	 already	 before)	 but	
which	did	not	fit	either	of	the	two	above	categories	(e.g.	the	child	did	perform	both	
above	behaviors,	for	example	pulling	on	the	tissue/taking	the	not-referred-to	object	
(aspectual	 tasks)	 and	 touching	 the	 box	 simultaneously,	 and	 it	was	 not	 clear	which	
reaction	was	a	response	to	the	searching	behavior	of	E2)	and		





above	 categories	 (e.g.	 giving	 the	 first	 object	 taken	 out	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task)	
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For	 28	 children	 (10	 in	 the	 Loc_FB,	 6	 in	 the	 Loc_TB,	 3	 in	 the	 Asp_FB	 and	 9	 in	 the	
Asp_TB	condition)	both	trials	were	coded	as	invalid	because	the	child	showed	no	reaction	to	
the	 signal	 (N	 =	20),	was	 inattentive	 (N	=	3),	or	 afraid	 (N	=	1),	or	because	of	experimental	
error	(N	=	4).	Data	from	109	children	were	thus	included	in	the	final	analysis.	Mean	age	was	
M	=	26;2	 (SD	 =	2.14,	11	girls,	15	boys)	 in	 the	non-aspectual	 FB	condition,	M	 =	26;2	 (SD	 =	
1.73,	11	girls,	14	boys)	in	the	non-aspectual	TB	condition,	M	=	26;1	(SD	=	1.95,	14	girls,	13	














in	 the	aspectual	 conditions	who	 received	at	 least	one	valid	 (including	ambiguous)	 trial,	of	
which	48	children	per	condition	had	at	least	one	valid	unambiguous	trial	in	each	case.	
	
Main	analyses.	As	 in	Exp.	1,	 for	 the	main	analysis	 the	 first	 valid	 and	unambiguous	
trial	of	the	96	children	to	which	this	applied	was	used	(see	Figure	6).	Invalid	and	ambiguous	
trials	were	replaced	by	the	second	trial	 if	this	was	a	valid	trial.	Children’s	helping	behavior	

















	 	 	 (a)		 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	




Analyses	 including	 ambiguous	 trials.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 main	 analysis	 were	
confirmed	in	analyses	also	including	ambiguous	responses	in	the	analyses	as	a	third	category	
(see	 Table	 3):	 the	 difference	 between	 conditions	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task	 remained	
significant	 (N	 =	51,	p	 =	 .004,	VCramer	=	 .461,	 two-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	 test),	whereas	 in	 the	









































	 TB	 FB	 TB	 FB	
help	to	search	in	box	 23	 13	 18	 11	
give	object	 1	 7	 5	 7	
ambiguous	response	 1	 6	 7	 10	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
